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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
*

THE STATE OF UTAH,

*
*
*
*

PlaintiftfPetitioner,
V.

*

TANJA RYNHART,

*

Defendant/Respondent.

MOTION, STIPULATION, AND
ORDER FOR ENLARGEMENT
OF TIME

Case No.: 20040115-SC

*
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This Court granted certiorari to review State v. Rynhart, 2003 UT App 410, 81 P.3d 814
which reversed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress. Jurisdiction exists
under Utah Code Ann., § 78-2-2(3)(a) and 2(5) (2001).
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did Defendant forfeit a reasonable expectation of privacy in her mini van and the
contents of her purse when she left the vehicle wreck and unlocked on another's property
between approximately 3:00 am and 8:30 am on a Sunday morning?
On certiorari review, this Court reviews the court of appeals' decision for correctness.
State v. Finlayson, 2004 UT 10, 84 P.3d 1193 (Utah 2004).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U.S. CONST. Amend, IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

UTAH STATE CONST., Article 1 Section 14:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On Sunday, January 6, 2002, at approximately 8:30 am Officer Burnham was dispatched
to a accident scene. Dispatch received a call from someone reporting the vehicle off the
roadway. The identity of the caller was never revealed during the preliminary hearing or hearing
on the motion to suppress. R72:3.
During his investigation, Officer Burnham determined that the vehicle left the roadway
around 3:00 am because of snow on the ground covered the tracks of the vehicle after it left the
roadway. R72:4.
Officer Burnham indicated in his testimony that he checked the vehicle to make sure no
one was in the vehicle and to try to determine who the owner and/or driver was. R72:4-5.
Officer Burnham located a woman's purse on the front passenger floor of the vehicle and
a briefcase on the front passenger seat. Officer Burnham searched through the purse, a wallet
contained in the purse and briefcase and removed these items from the vehicle. A controlled
substance was found during the search of the purse. R72:5-6.
Officer Burnham acknowledged that he was familiar with the abandoned vehicle statute
and conceded that the vehicle did not meet the statutory definition. R72:8 Officer Burnham also
stated that he did not impound the vehicle but simply had it towed for "safe keeping so that the
property owner, who was the Sheriff of Box Elder County, could have the fences repaired. R72:6,
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8.R73:11.
No where in Officer Burnham's testimony did he indicate a belief that the vehicle had
been abandoned.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as well as Article 1
Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah provide in relevant part: "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated." Warrantless searches are per se unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment unless conducted pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.
The burden is on the State to demonstrate that the facts and circumstances surrounding a
warrantless search fall within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. In the
absence of such an exception, any evidence discovered during the unlawful search must be
suppressed.
The State concedes the point that there is no issue as to Defendant's ownership of the
vehicle and purse subject to the search. Nor does the State contest the legitimacy of Defendant's
reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle or the purse. Therefore, the determining issue is
whether Defendant by leaving the van with the doors closed, but unlocked between the hours or
approximately 3:00 am and 8:30 am on a Sunday morning after having slid off the road, down an
embankment and through two fences to come to rest in a swampy marsh evinces an intent to
abandon the vehicle, her purse, with her personal identification in it, $329.00 in cash and other
personal papers, even temporarily
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ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT DID NOT FORFEIT HER REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY WHEN SHE LEFT HER VEHICLE IN THE MIDDLE OF A MARSH AFTER
AN ACCIDENT AT APPROXIMATELY 3:00 AM ON A SNOWY SUNDAY MORNING.
(A) The Court of Appeals in Rynhart Correctly Held That Defendant Did Not Abandon
Her Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Her Vehicle or Her Purse.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as well as Article 1
Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah provide in relevant part: "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated." Warrantless search are considered per se unconstitutional. Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967); State v. Brown, 853
P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992).
"It has long been established that in the absence of a valid search warrant, ,f[t]he State
must demonstrate 'that the circumstances of the [search or] seizure constitute an exception to the
warrant requirement.'" State v. Earl, 92 P.3d 167 (Utah Ct. App 2004) quoting State v. Wells,
928 P.2d 386, 389 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citations omitted). In the absence of either a warrant or
facts that establish the existence of an exception to the warrant requirement, any evidence
discovered as a result of the search must be suppressed. See, e.g., Id., at 389-91 (determining that
the state's evidence must be suppressed after the state failed to demonstrate the applicability of an
exception to the warrant requirement).
The trial Court correctly ruled on the State's alternate theory at the suppression hearing
holding that objective factors that weighed against the finding of abandonment include, "[t]he
owner or driver would not have had time to make arrangements to retrieve the vehicle if
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damaged...The apparent early hour, the winter conditions, and the single vehicle nature of the
accident all combine to belie the officer's imputing an intent to abandon the vehicle." R46.
The Court of Appeals likewise agreed finding, "We then determine that (1) Rynhart
clearly had a subjective expectation of privacy not just in her vehicle, but also in its contents; and
(2) as the trial court's unchallenged findings on abandonment establish, this expectation was
reasonable." R:85.
(B) The Search of Defendant's Vehicle and Purse is Not Justified Under the
Abandonment Rule Either Statutorily or Factually Given the Totality of
Circumstances.

The State relies on the principal of abandonment as it's exception to the warrant
requirement to justify Officer Burnham's entry into Defendant's vehicle and subsequent search
of Defendant's wallet which was located in her purse. The burden of proving abandonment falls
on the State...and must be shown by clear unequivocal and decisive evidence. State v. Bissenger,
76 P.3d 178 (Utah Ct.App. 2003) quoting State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 736 (Utah Ct.App.
1991)(quotations and citations omitted ), rev'd on other grounds, 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992).
This burden of proof established in Bessinger and Rowe has been adopted in other criminal
cases, not just property cases. See Friedman v. United States, 347 F.2d 697, 704, (8th Cir.
1965); See also United States v. Boswell, 347 A.2d 270, 274 (D.C.I975); O'Shaughnessy v.
State, 420 So.2d 377, 379 (Fla. Dist.Ct. App. 1982).
There are two situations where a vehicle may be considered abandoned. The first is
statutorily and the second is factually. First, abandoned vehicles are clearly defined in UTAH
CODE ANN., § 41-6-116.10 which provides in relevant part:
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(1) As used in this section, "abandoned vehicle" means a vehicle that
is left unattended:
(a) on a highway for a period in excess of 48 hours; or
(b) on any public or private property for a period in excess of seven
days without express or implied consent of the owner or person in lawful
possession or control of the property. (2001).
It is clear Defendant did not abandon her vehicle under the statutory definition of
abandoned vehicles. Officer Burnham even conceded that point during cross-examination at the
preliminary hearing R72:8. Defendant's vehicle was left at the scene of the slide off for less than
8 hours with five of those hours coming before 8:00 am on a Sunday.
Second, there are circumstances where abandonment may be determined in less than the
statutorily prescribed time frames. In these types of cases, the test for abandonment is whether
an individual has retained any reasonable expectation of privacy in the object. US v. Diggs, 649
F.2d 731, 735 (9th Cir), cert.denied, 454 U.S., 970 (1981). This determination is made from an
objective standard which may be inferred from words, spoken, acts done, or other objective facts.
U.S. v. Kendall, 655 F.2d 199, 202 (9th Cir 1981).
Examples of these types of cases where abandonment maybe inferred from words
spoken, acts done, or other objective facts include where an individual flees a vehicle after a high
speed police pursuit, U.S. v. Haslip, 160 F.2d 649 (10th Cir 1998), (the vehicle in question had
been the subject of a police pursuit and was found down an embankment, with the car still in
gear with the engine running and the passenger door wide open.),, US v. Barlow, 17 F3.3d 85,88
(5th Cir) (Barlow left his car parked at night at the end of a public street, away from public
parking, behind a shopping center and near its back alley where only deliveries occur, unlocked,
and with the key in the ignition and the registered owner claimed to no longer own the car), or
6

where objects are discarded in the presence of officers U.S. v. Trimble, 986 F.2d 394 (10th
Cir.1993) (defendant discarded a bag and a vial in the presence of the officer), or where property
was left in a location for such a duration that a reasonable person would consider it abandoned
US v. Diggs, 649 F2d 731 at 735, (defendant abandoned property in a motel room for 2.5
months.), or where specific statements made by the defendant clearly indicate no interest in the
property, U.S. v. Kendall, 655 F.2d 199 (9th Cir 1981) (defendant showed a luggage claim ticket
that did not match the bag in question and stated that his name was not on the bag in an effort to
give the officers the impression that he had no interest in the bag at issue.)
No such circumstances are found in the present case. The undisputed facts are that
Defendant left the roadway in a rural area of Box Elder County sometime before 3:00 am on a
dark, snowy Sunday morning. It can be reasonably inferred from the facts of this case that
Defendant exited her vehicle shut the door and walked to the roadway and either walked or was
given a ride to a subsequent location.
There was no testimony that the vehicle doors were open or that the keys were left in the
ignition. In fact Officer Burnham specifically testified that he personally opened all the doors.
R73:12. Given the fact that the van traveled down an embankment through two fences coming to
rest in a marsh, there is little doubt that the vehicle could be removed back to the roadway
without the aid of a tow truck or some other vehicle.
(C) Utah Code Ann., § 41-6-32 Does Not Support the Presumption of Abandonment
The State's attempt to impute further statutory responsibility on Defendant and thus add
to a presumption of abandonment is misplaced. The plain reading of UTAH CODE ANN., §416-32 clearly envisions the responsibility of the operator of a vehicle that is still operational and
7

capable of leaving the scene of an accident. The requirement is that the operator of such a
vehicle "shall immediately stop..." Based on the facts, it is reasonable to assume that
Defendant's mini van was going no where. Given the fact that the vehicle was licensed, it was
unlikely that her identity would remain a mystery. It is equally unrealistic to expect to expect
Defendant to locate the property owner at approximately 3:00 am on a Sunday or further to write
her name and address on a piece of paper at attach it on a conspicuous place.
(D) Defendant's Vehicle, While Unlocked, Did Not Become a Freely Accessible Place
for the Public and/or Law Enforcement
The State's assumption that any passer by could have fully accessed the interior of her
vehicle is correct; however, then such a passer by could be charged with criminal trespass,
UTAH CODE ANN., § 76-6-206 or worse, vehicle burglary UTAH CODE ANN., § 76-6-204
should the passer by be found rifling through Defendant's wallet and briefcase as Officer
Burnham did.
The logic as herein applied by the State would then authorize law enforcement officers to
search any vehicle as long as any member of the public could access the vehicle without breaking
into such vehicle. Such logic flies in the face of the constitutional protections citizens enjoy.
Slide off accidents and stuck vehicles are nothing unusual during the winter months in
Utah. In fact one only has to listen to the morning traffic reports on the radio on any day snow
falls to learn that this is common occurrence.. Given the rural nature of most of the state it is not
unusual for the drivers of such vehicles to leave the vehicle in an effort to obtain assistance rather
than wait patiently in the cold and dark for assistance to arrive. The simple fact that a driver may
forget to lock the vehicle to protect possible valuables inside the vehicle is insufficient to imply

8

that it was the intent of that person to discard the property and relinquish her reasonable
expectation of privacy so that it's search and seizure is reasonable under the limits of the Fourth
Amendment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the Court of Appeal's reversal of the
Trial Court's decision to deny Defendant her motion to suppress and remand this matter to the
trial court for further action consistent with the Court of Appeals' decision.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of February, 2005.

JAMES M. RETALLICK
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that on the
day of February, 2005,1 caused the above Brief of Respondent,
to be mailed/hand delivered to:
CHRISTINE SOLTIS
MARION DECKER
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Petitioner
JAMES M. RETALLICK
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that it was the intent of that person to discard the property and relinquish her reasonable
expectation of privacy so that it's search and seizure is reasonable under the limits of the Fourth
Amendment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the Court of Appeal's reversal of the
Trial Court's decision to deny Defendant her motion to suppress and remand this matter to the
trial court for further action consistent with the Court of Appeals' decision.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this r

day of February, 2005.

JAPES M. RETALLICK
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent
MAILING CERTIFICATE
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I certify that on the / day of February, 2005,1 caused the above Brief of Respondent,
to be mailed/hand delivered to:
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MARION DECKER
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Petitioner

ESM.'RETALLICK
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

41-6-116.10. Abandoned vehicles — Removal by peace officer —
Report — Vehicle identification.
(1) As used in this section, "abandoned vehicle" means a vehicle that
is left unattended:
(a) on a highway for a period in excess of 48 hours; or
(b) on any public or private property for a period in excess of seven
days without express or implied consent of the owner or person in lawful
possession or control of the property.
(2) A person may not abandon a vehicle upon any highway.
(3) A person may not abandon a vehicle upon any public or private
property without the express or implied consent of the owner or person in
lawful possession or control of the property.
(4) A peace officer who has reasonable grounds to believe that a
vehicle has been abandoned may remove the vehicle or cause it to be
removed in accordance with Section 41-6-102.5.
(5) If the motor number, manufacturer's number or identification mark
of the abandoned vehicle has been defaced, altered or obliterated, the
vehicle may not be released or sold until the original motor number,
manufacturer's number or identification mark has been replaced, or until
a new number assigned by the Motor Vehicle Division has been stamped on
the vehicle.

Addendum B

76-6-206. Criminal trespass.
(1) For purposes of this section, "enter" means intrusion of the
entire body.
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under circumstances
not amounting to burglary as defined in Section 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or
76-6-204 or a violation of Section 76-10-2402 regarding commercial
terrorism:
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and:
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person or damage to
any property, including the use of graffiti as defined in Section 76-6-107;
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony; or
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the
safety of another;
(b) knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he enters or remains on
property as to which notice against entering is given by:
(i) personal communication to the actor by the owner or someone with
apparent authority to act for the owner;
(ii) fencing or other enclosure obviously designed to exclude
intruders; or
(iii) posting of signs reasonably likely to come to the attention of
intruders; or
(c) he enters a condominium unit in violation of Subsection 57-8-7(7).
(3)(a) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) is a class C misdemeanor
unless it was committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a class B
misdemeanor.
(b) A violation of Subsection (2)(b) is an infraction.
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the:
(a) property was open to the public when the actor entered or
remained; and
(b) actor's conduct did not substantially interfere with the owner's
use of the property.

Addendum C

76-6-204, Burglary of a vehicle — Charge of other offense.
(1) Any person who unlawfully enters any vehicle with intent to commit
a felony or theft is guilty of a burglary of a vehicle.
(2) Burglary of a vehicle is a class A misdemeanor.
(3) A charge against any person for a violation of Subsection (1)
shall not preclude a charge for a commission of any other offense.

